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• Oligarchic Consensus: lack of 
membership influence on 
policy
• Michels‟ „Iron Law of Oligarchy‟
• Danish Socialist People‟s Party
• SF a „deviant case‟
• Tony Benn:
„That is going to be 
a very short book. 
At the moment it is 
zero‟
• Oligarchic Consensus
• Duverger‟s Mass party
• Post-war catch-all/ electoral 
professional parties






„leaders tend naturally to retain power and increase it,
because their members scarcely hinder this tendency and
on the contrary even strengthen it by hero-worshipping the
leaders: on all these points the analysis of Roberto Michels
continues to hold true‟ (Duverger 1964: 134)
• The iron law of oligarchy
2. Leaders holding on to their 
positions
1. Need for professional 
leadership in organisations 
above a certain size
3. Laws of tactics
4. Membership gratitude
Membership gratitude































73.6 69 34.5 59 29.7 29.3 27.8 24.3 11.7
• Membership influence when:
• Low government ambitions
• Proportional electoral system
• When the members want it
• SF:
• Low government ambitions
• Membership influence in SF
• „Ungrateful‟ members
• Danish list PR
Conclusions
1. It is possible for members to have 
influence on party policy
2. Membership influence not a matter 
of mass party vs catch-all party:
• Environment (proportionality)
• Government ambitions of 
leaders
• Attitudes of members
Conclusions
• Need more research, but…
• Data
• SF only one case
• Membership influence does exist 
and worth taking seriously
